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6。 An army may march great distances without distress； if it marches through country where the enemy is not。
7。 You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended。 You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked。
8。 Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend； and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack。
9。 O divine art of subtlety and secrecy！ Through you we learn to be invisible； through you inaudible； and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands。
10。 You may advance and be absolutely irresistible； if you make for the enemy's weak points； you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy。
11。 If we wish to fight； the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch。 All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve。
12。 If we do not wish to fight； we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground。 All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way。
13。 By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves； we can keep our forces concentrated； while the enemy's must be divided。
14。 We can form a single united body； while the enemy must split up into fractions。 Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole； which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few。
15。 And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one； our opponents will be in dire straits。
16。 The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known； for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points； and his forces being thus distributed in many directions； the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few。
17。 For should the enemy strengthen his van； he will weaken his rear； should he strengthen his rear； he will weaken his van； should he strengthen his left； he will weaken his right； should he strengthen his right； he will weaken his left。 If he sends reinforcements everywhere； he will everywhere be weak。
18。 Numerical weakness es from having to prepare against possible attacks； numerical strength； from pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us。
19。 Knowing the place and the time of the ing battle； we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight。
20。 But if neither time nor place be known； then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right； the right equally impotent to succor the left； the van unable to relieve the rear； or the rear to support the van。 How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart； and even the nearest are separated by several LI！
21。 Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number； that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory。 I say then that victory can be achieved。
22。 Though the enemy be stronger in numbers； we may prevent him from fighting。 Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success。
23。 Rouse him； and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity。 Force him to reveal himself； so as to find out his vulnerable spots。
24。 Carefully pare the opposing army with your own； so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient。
25。 In making tactical dispositions； the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them； conceal your dispositions； and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies； from the machinations of the wisest brains。
26。 How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tacticsthat is what the multitude cannot prehend。
27。 All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer； but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved。
28。 Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory； but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances。
29。 Military tactics are like unto water； for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards。
30。 So in war； the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak。
31。 Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows； the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing。
32。 Therefore； just as water retains no constant shape； so in warfare there are no constant conditions。
33。 He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning； may be called a heaven…born captain。
34。 The five elements （water； fire； wood； metal； earth） are not always equally predominant； the four seasons make way for each other in turn。 There are short days and long； the moon has its periods of waning and waxing。
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07《孫子兵法》軍爭篇第七
孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命于君，合軍聚眾，交和而舍，莫難于軍爭。軍爭之難者，以迂為直，以患為利。故迂其途，而誘之以利，後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者也。
故軍爭為利，軍爭為危。舉軍而爭利，則不及﹔委軍而爭利，則輜重捐。是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，百里而爭利，則擒三將軍，勁者先，疲者後，其法十一而至﹔五十里而爭利，則蹶上將軍，其法半至﹔三十里而爭利，則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。
故不知諸侯之终撸荒茉ソ哗r不知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者，不能行軍﹔不用鄉導者，不能得地利。
故兵以詐立，以利動，以分和為變者也。
故其疾如風，其徐如林，侵掠如火，不動如山，難知如陰，動如雷震。
掠鄉分眾，廓地分守，懸權而動。
先知迂直之計者勝，此軍爭之法也。
軍政曰：「言不相聞，故為金鼓；視而不見，故為旌旗。」夫金鼓旌旗者，所以一人之耳目也；人既專一， 則勇者不得獨進，怯者不得獨退，此用眾之法也。故夜戰多火鼓，晝戰多旌旗，所以變人之耳目也。
故三軍可奪氣，將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳，晝氣惰，暮氣歸。故善用兵者，避其銳氣，擊其惰歸，此治氣者也。以治待亂，以靜待嘩，此治心者也。以近待遠，以佚待勞，以飽待铮酥瘟φ咭病o邀正正之旗，無擊堂堂之陣，此治變者也。
故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背丘勿逆，佯北勿從，銳卒勿攻，餌兵勿食，歸師勿遏，圍師遺闕，窮寇勿迫，此用兵之法也。
VII。 MANEUVERING
1。 Sun Tzu said： In war； the general receives his mands from the sovereign。
2。 Having collected an army and concentrated his forces； he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp。
3。 After that； es tactical maneuvering； than which there is nothing more difficult。 The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct； and misfortune into gain。
4。 Thus； to take a long and circuitous route； after enticing the enemy out of the way； and though starting after him； to contrive to reach the goal before him； shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION。
5。 Maneuvering with an army is advantageous； with an undisciplined multitude； most dangerous。
6。 If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage； the chances are that you will be too late。 On the other hand； to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores。
7。 Thus； if you order your men to roll up their buff…coats； and make forced marches without halting day or night； covering double the usual distance at a stretch； doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an vantage； the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy。
8。 The stronger men will be in front； the jaded ones will fall behind； and on this plan only one…tenth of your army will reach its destination。
9。 If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy； you will lose the leader of your first division； and only half your force will reach the goal。
10。 If you march thirty LI with the same object； two…thirds of your army will arrive。
11。 We may take it then that an army without its baggage…train is lost； without provisions it is lost； without bases of supply it is lost。
12。 We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors。
13。 We are not fi