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笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第3章

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first of all obliged to state them。  I shall only say in
general that all that is said by the atheist against the
existence of God; always depends either on the fact that we
ascribe to God affections which are human; or that we
attribute so much strength and wisdom to our minds that we
even have the presumption to desire to determine and
understand that which God can and ought to do。  In this way
all that they allege will cause us no difficulty; provided
only we remember that we must consider our minds as things
which are finite and limited; and God as a Being who is
inprehensible and infinite。
     Now that I have once for all recognised and acknowledged
the opinions of men; I at once begin to treat of God and the
Human soul; and at the same time to treat of the whole of the
First Philosophy; without however expecting any praise from
the vulgar and without the hope that my book will have many
readers。  On the contrary; I should never advise anyone to
read it excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with
me; and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense; and
deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice。  I
know too well that such men exist in a very small number。  But
for those who; without caring to prehend the order and
connections of my reasonings; form their criticisms on
detached portions arbitrarily selected; as is the custom with
many; these; I say; will not obtain much profit from reading
this Treatise。  And although they perhaps in several parts
find occasion of cavilling; they can for all their pains make
no objection which is urgent or deserving of reply。
     And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy
them at once; and as I do not presume so much on my own powers
as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause
difficulty to anyone; I shall first of all set forth in these
Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself
that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the
truth; in order to see if; by the same reasons which persuaded
me; I can also persuade others。  And; after that; I shall
reply to the objections which have been made to me by persons
of genius and learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for
examination; before submitting them to the press。  For they
have made so many objections and these so different; that I
venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to
bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not
been already touched upon。  This is why I beg those who read
these Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they
have given themselves the trouble to read all the objections
as well as the replies which I have made to them。6

          Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations。
     
     In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which
we may; generally speaking; doubt about all things and
especially about material things; at least so long as we have
no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have
hitherto possessed。  But although the utility of a Doubt which
is so general does not at first appear; it is at the same time
very great; inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of
prejudice; and sets out for us a very simple way by which the
mind may detach itself from the senses; and finally it makes
it impossible for us ever to doubt those things which we have
once discovered to be true。
     In the second Meditation; mind; which making use of the
liberty which pertains to it; takes for granted that all those
things of whose existence it has the least doubt; are non…
existent; recognises that it is however absolutely impossible
that it does not itself exist。  This point is likewise of the
greatest moment; inasmuch as by this means a distinction is
easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind that is
to say to the intellectual nature and those which pertain to
body。
     But because it may be that some expect from me in this
place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality
of the soul; I feel that I should here make known to them that
having aimed at writing nothing in all this Treatise of which
I do not possess very exact demonstrations; I am obliged to
follow a similar order to that made use of by the geometers;
which is to begin by putting forward as premises all those
things upon which the proposition that we seek depends; before
ing to any conclusion regarding it。  Now the first and
principal matter which is requisite for thoroughly
understanding the immortality of the soul is to form the
clearest possible conception of it; and one which will be
entirely distinct from all the conceptions which we may have
of body; and in this Meditation this has been done。  In
addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that
all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are
true in the very way in which we think them; and this could
not be proved previously to the Fourth Mediation。  Further we
must have a distinct conception of corporeal nature; which is
given partly in this Second; and partly in the Fifth and Sixth
Meditations。  And finally we should conclude from all this;
that those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as
being diverse substances; as we regard mind and body to be;
are really substances essentially distinct one from the other;
and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation。  This is
further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we
cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is
divisible; while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as
indivisible。  For we are not able to conceive of the half of a
mind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies; so that we
see that not only are their natures different but even in some
respects contrary to one another。  I have not however dealt
further with this matter in this treatise; both because what I
have said is sufficient to show clearly enough that the
extinction of the mind does not follow from the corruption of
the body; and also to give men the hope of another life after
death; as also because the premises from which the immortality
of the soul may be deduced depend on an elucidation of a
plete system of Physics。  This would mean to establish in
the first place that all substances generally that is to say
all things which cannot exist without being created by God¥are
in their nature incorruptible; and that they can never cease
to exist unless God; in denying to them his concurrence;
reduce them to nought; and secondly that body; regarded
generally; is a substance; which is the reason why it also
cannot perish; but that the human body; inasmuch as it differs
from other bodies; is posed only of a certain configuration
of members and of other similar accidents; while the human
mind is not similarly posed of any accidents; but is a pure
substance。  For although all the accidents of mind be changed;
although; for instance; it think certain things; will others;
perceive others; etc。; despite all this it does not emerge
from these changes another mind:  the human body on the other
hand bees a different thing from the sole fact that the
figure or form of any of its portions is found to be changed。
From this it follows that the human body may indeed easily
enough perish; but the mind 'or soul of man (I make no
distinction between them)' is owing to its nature immortal。
     In the third Meditation it seems to me that I have
explained at sufficient length the principal argument of which
I make use in order to prove the existence of God。  But none
the less; because I did not wish in that place to make use of
any parisons derived from corporeal things; so as to
withdraw as much as I could the minds of readers from the
senses; there may perhaps have remained many obscurities
which; however; will; I hope; be entirely removed by the
Replies which I have made to the Objections which have been
set before me。  Amongst others there is; for example; this
one; 〃How the idea in us of a being supremely perfect
possesses so much objective reality 'that is to say
participates by representation in so many degrees of being and
perfection' 
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